Skip to main content

tom_secrets_core 0.2.7 copy "tom_secrets_core: ^0.2.7" to clipboard
tom_secrets_core: ^0.2.7 copied to clipboard

The core of the Tom Secrets Manager: secret stores over KDBX files, overlays, dimensions and the resolution of secret references, the GitHub vault cycle and the outer encryption.

Changelog #

0.2.7 #

  • The GitHub App sign-in's records (part-key-rotation §3, DP-83, DP-155): the primary's metadata keeps the App's client id (TomSecretsMetadata.githubAppClientId, tsm.github-app-client-id; copyWith(githubAppClientId:, clearGithubAppClientId:)); a device record names how the device reaches GitHub (TomSecretsGitHubAuth app or token) and when its token expires (githubAuth, githubTokenExpires, withGitHub, TomSecretsDeviceRecords.setGitHub).

0.2.6 #

  • The agent's side of SSH (part-os-integration, DP-48, DP-49): TomSecretsSshPrivateKey.decode reads a private key file with its passphrase (OpenSSH openssh-key-v1 unencrypted or under bcrypt_pbkdf with AES-CTR, -CBC or -GCM; PEM PKCS#1 and SEC1, also DEK-Info-encrypted with AES-CBC or DES-EDE3-CBC; PKCS#8, also PBES2-encrypted) and signs as SSH does (Ed25519; ECDSA P-256/P-384/P-521 with RFC 6979 nonces; rsa-sha2-256 / rsa-sha2-512, never SHA-1); tomSecretsSshVerify checks a signature; tomSecretsBcryptPbkdf is OpenBSD's KDF.
  • The agent protocol (draft-miller-ssh-agent): TomSecretsSshAgentFramer, TomSecretsSshAgentConnection over a TomSecretsSshAgentBackend (identities, signatures, session-bind@openssh.com checked and recorded, a user authentication on a bound connection checked against its session, everything else refused), TomSecretsSshSignRequest with its destination, forwarding and purpose (userauth, sshsig with its namespace).
  • TomSecretsSshGrantSecret: an agent grant's secret, ssh-key [host <fingerprints>] [forward] <target>; tomSecretsSshAgentStateOf: whether the agent serves an entry's key and why not, and whether each use is confirmed; tomSecretsKnownHostNames; tomSecretsSshFingerprint.
  • TomSecretsKeeAgentSettings.copyWith, tomSecretsKeeAgentSettingsOf, tomSecretsWriteKeeAgentSettings.
  • The vault setting tsm.ssh-confirm (TomSecretsMetadata.sshConfirm, copyWith): every agent signature with a key of the vault is confirmed.
  • PKCS#8 EC keys with explicit curve parameters (LibreSSL's ssh-keygen -m PKCS8) are read.

0.2.5 #

  • The typed SSH key (part-structure, DP-5): tomSecretsWriteSshKey makes an entry ssh-key with the private key as a protected attachment and KeeAgent.settings naming it (TomSecretsKeeAgentSettings, written as KeePassXC writes it, UTF-16); tomSecretsSshKeyOf finds an entry's key.
  • TomSecretsSshKeyInfo.parse reads a private key file without its passphrase: OpenSSH (encrypted or not), PKCS#1, SEC1 (named or explicit curves), PKCS#8; the type, the public key as authorized_keys writes it, the fingerprint, the size.
  • tomSecretsGenerateSshKey (DP-179): Ed25519, or RSA 4096 for a tool that needs RSA, written in OpenSSH's format.
  • tomSecretsMigrateSshKeys: phase A's notes holding a key (and KeePassXC's entries) become typed SSH keys, their old state in the history.
  • The 1Password import types an SSH key whose key the export carries.

0.2.4 #

  • URL matching of login entries (part-browser, protocol.md 5.7): tomSecretsMatchLogins (the entries of a page, exact host before domain, then the last used, then by title; a frame only when it is the same site), TomSecretsSiteUrl (normalised: https without a scheme, punycode hosts, default ports dropped), tomSecretsMatchSiteUrl with the tsm.urlMatch rules domain, host, exact, never (TomSecretsEntryFields.urlMatch), tomSecretsRegistrableDomain after the Public Suffix List, which the package carries as data (tool/update_public_suffix_list.py; MPL-2.0, see THIRD_PARTY.md).

0.2.3 #

  • tomSecretsReceivePairingForSetup takes linkAddress: where the new machine's approval link will listen, sent to the giving machine with its keys so the giver records it and opens the link; checked with tom_secrets_client's tomSecretsApprovalLinkProblem. Needs tom_secrets_client 0.2.4.

0.2.2 #

  • The README rewritten as the package's manual; API summaries of every area in doc/api/.

0.2.1 #

  • Setting a machine up by pairing (part-sharing): tomSecretsReceivePairingForSetup receives with fresh trust material and refuses a bundle a new machine cannot be set up from (tomSecretsPairingSetupProblem: the primary missing, a github: primary without its token); TomSecretsFirstRun.runPaired sets the machine up from the receipt; tomSecretsParsePairingAddress reads the host:port the giving side shows.
  • The pairing: a receiving side may refuse the bundle (TomSecretsPairingRefusal, {"op":"refused","reason"}), which ends it with TomSecretsPairingFailure.refused on both sides.
  • TomSecretsTrust.recordPeer: what a pairing gave, recorded in the trust material.

0.2.0 #

  • Pairing (part-sharing, DP-60–DP-64, DP-177):
    • TomSecretsSpake2: SPAKE2 as RFC 9382 specifies it (P256-SHA256-HKDF-HMAC, the RFC's M and N, key confirmation), checked with the RFC's test vectors, refusing a point off the curve.
    • tomSecretsGivePairing / tomSecretsReceivePairing: the pairing over a channel. The code (TomSecretsPairingCode, <number>-<word>-<word>) proved by SPAKE2, an ML-KEM-768 exchange inside, the session key mixing both secrets with the transcript; then the giving side's bundle (TomSecretsPairingBundle: vaults with their key files and repository keys, the shared configuration, tokens pasted for the device, its public keys), the receiving side's public keys, and the approval-token key both derive.
    • TomSecretsPairingWindow: the giving side's window on the LAN and VPN addresses only, the first connection only, five minutes.
    • tomSecretsReceivePairingAt: the receiving side over TCP.
  • TomSecretsDeviceRecords: the device records of the primary (.tom-secrets/devices, DP-62).
  • TomSecretsLinkFrameReader: the approval link's framing, for pairing.

0.1.6 #

  • TomSecretsLinkSession.underPreviousKey: on the host, whether the approver connected under the host's previous link key, so the host passes it the new one.

0.1.5 #

  • A device rotates its own key pairs (part-key-rotation): TomSecretsTrust.rotateApproverKey makes a new hybrid approver pair and answers the key-change statement signed by the old and the new pair; rotateLinkKey makes a new approval-link pair and keeps the previous one for the hosts the new key has not reached (linkKeyFor, markLinkKeyDelivered, linkKeyPending) during the migration period (tomSecretsLinkKeyMigration, 14 days; expirePreviousLinkKey; previousLinkKey, kept to the end of the period while approvers are recorded).
  • TomSecretsLinkSession.respond(previousMe:) also answers an approver that still holds the host's previous link key.

0.1.4 #

  • TomSecretsVaultUnit.rekey: commits a re-keyed file as it is in one commit on top of the base's head (never merged; a moved branch is refused with TomCasConflictException), after which the unit reads and writes with the new credentials and outer layer.

0.1.3 #

  • TomSecretsVaultUnit.mergeOverRemote merges a working copy handed in with replaceWorking(stored:) over the rewritten remote instead of pushing the bytes it was given, and takeRemote drops those bytes.

0.1.2 #

  • The device settings carry the rotation ages and the reminder start of DP-85: otherKeyWarningDays (30), keyPairAgeMonths (24), primaryKeyAgeMonths (24), vaultKeyAgeMonths (12).

0.1.1 #

  • TomSecretsResolver.explain: a request explained step by step (the request's values, every candidate kept with its rank vector or dropped by the binding that drops it, the outcome with its winner or tied candidates), ranked through the same code as resolve.

0.1.0 #

  • Stores over KDBX files with their index (logical paths, bindings, keys), overlays in both placements, the metadata entry and tsm.config, dimensions with priority, configured defaults and fallback_to_default, resolution with its rank vectors, ambiguity and fields (string fields, attachments, totp, refused passkey fields), the KDBX mapping and TOTP (RFC 6238, the three conventions).
  • Vault locators, the GitHub cycle as a tom_core_sync sync unit over tom_core_storage (TomGitHubStorage, no clone), the three-way vault merge with conflict records, and the primary vault's .tom-secrets/vaults.
  • tomSecretsDeviceCommitter: the device as author and committer of the cycle's commits (<device>@tsm.invalid), for TomGitHubStorage.committer (tom_core_storage 0.1.1).
  • Signed objects, approval codes and tokens, the approval link (both roles), the grants group tsm.grants/<host> and the device's trust material (protocol.md 9; tom_pqc for ML-DSA-65 and ML-KEM-768).
  • TomSecretsFieldValue held as a TomProtectedValue (tom_crypto 1.5.0): withBytes hands out bytes zeroed after use, dispose zeroes it without touching the vault's attachment.
  • Key files (TomSecretsKeyFile, KeePass 2.0 XML) in the composite key, the key derived once from the file's bytes as KeePass derives it, and the .tsmx outer format with key slots under XChaCha20-Poly1305 (default) or AES-256-GCM (tomSecretsOuterEncrypt / Decrypt, TomSecretsOuterCodec, TomSecretsRepositoryKey).
  • New vaults (tomSecretsNewVault): KDBX 4.1 keyed through Argon2id, tomSecretsDefaultArgon2 (64 MiB, 3 iterations); TomSecretsVaultUnit.create refuses a file keyed otherwise.
  • The offline cache (TomSecretsOfflineCache) in the vault cycle: kept on every read and write, opened from when the remote is unreachable or refuses the token; telling a compaction from a force push (tomSecretsClassifyMove, TomSecretsCommitReader, TomSecretsHistoryRewritten, mergeOverRemote); the app's compaction with tom_git (tomSecretsCompact) and the compaction workflow, script and configuration for the vault repositories (tomSecretsCompactionFiles).
  • Imports (tomSecretsImport, TomSecretsImportSource, the report) and the 1Password importer for 1PUX and CSV (tomSecretsRead1Pux, tomSecretsRead1PasswordCsv).
  • The Enpass importer for JSON and CSV (tomSecretsReadEnpassJson, tomSecretsReadEnpassCsv) with passkeys into KPEX_PASSKEY_* (TomSecretsPasskey, tomSecretsPasskeyPem), and the Enpass JSON export (tomSecretsExportEnpassJson). Imports know folders, trashed items and kept passkeys.
  • The device settings and their container with the key modes (TomSecretsDeviceSettings, TomSecretsDeviceContainer, TomSecretsDeviceKeys, TomSecretsLockPolicy); the KDBX types the other packages handle are re-exported (DP-29). A .tom-secrets group is never indexed, at any depth.
  • The first run (TomSecretsFirstRun): a primary created or opened, local or on GitHub, its key file and repository key kept in the device keychain (tsm.key-file.<id>, tsm.repository-key.<id>), tsm.keys-due 24 months on, the device settings and bootstrap.yaml; a .tsmx rewrite keeps its cipher; a .kdbx.tsmx file's store name drops both suffixes.
0
likes
0
points
391
downloads

Publisher

unverified uploader

Weekly Downloads

The core of the Tom Secrets Manager: secret stores over KDBX files, overlays, dimensions and the resolution of secret references, the GitHub vault cycle and the outer encryption.

Homepage
Repository (GitHub)
View/report issues

License

unknown (license)

Dependencies

archive, crypto, cryptography, http, pointycastle, tom_core_storage, tom_core_sync, tom_crypto, tom_git, tom_github_api, tom_kdbx_store, tom_pqc, tom_secrets_client, yaml

More

Packages that depend on tom_secrets_core