koni_tar 0.9.0

TAR reader and writer (ustar, PAX, GNU extensions) for the koni_archive ecosystem.

Changelog

0.9.0 - 2026-07-17

• Honors the read-side size limits (ArchiveReadOptions.maxEntrySize / maxEntryCount) via the shared reader seam. TAR has no up-front entry count, so the count limit is enforced once the index is built.

0.8.0 - 2026-07-16

• The writer honors ArchiveWriteOptions.allowUnsafePaths (see koni_archive_core 0.8.0). TarWriter now takes the ArchiveWriteOptions its format was opened with, matching the ZIP and 7z writers; it previously took none, because TAR consults no other option (password/encryptHeader are rejected up front by TarWriteFormat.openWriter, and entries are always stored). allowUnsafePaths is the first format-agnostic write option, so this is the first one TAR needs.

0.7.0 - 2026-07-16

• Lockstep release; no changes to this package since 0.6.0.

0.6.0 - 2026-07-15

• TarWriteFormat.openWriter now rejects a non-null ArchiveWriteOptions.password with UnsupportedCompressionException; TAR has no standard encryption, so a password can only mislead. Otherwise a lockstep release with Phase 4 (write-side encryption for ZIP/7z).
• First release published to pub.dev.

0.5.0 - 2026-07-15

• Lockstep release with the Phase 3 (decryption) work; no changes to koni_tar (TAR has no native encryption).

0.4.0 - 2026-07-15

• P2-2: TAR writing: TarWriter / TarWriteFormat. Emits ustar, with a PAX (x) extended header when a path, link target, or size exceeds the ustar fields (11-octal-digit size ≈ 8 GiB); streaming input, all entry types the reader represents (files, dirs, symlinks, hardlinks, fifos, devices), validateWritePath path safety. Field encodings are the exact inverse of the reader's. Interop DoD: bsdtar lists and extracts our output byte-for-byte.

0.3.0 - 2026-07-15

• Lockstep release; no changes since 0.2.0.

0.2.0 - 2026-07-15

• lockstep release; no changes since 0.1.0.

0.1.0 - 2026-07-15

• M2: TAR reader, full scope.
  • ustar (incl. path prefix), PAX extended + global headers, GNU long-name/long-link, old-GNU magic, magic-less v7 (checksum-validated), base-256 numeric fields (incl. negative mtimes), signed-checksum tolerance.
  • All entry types represented as metadata (file/dir/symlink/hardlink/ fifo/devices); GNU sparse detected -> typed error at openRead while the rest of the archive stays readable.
  • Streaming reads in 64 KiB chunks with bounded memory (2 GiB entry memory-regression test); attacker-facing hardening (path sanitization + escape flag, metadata size caps, typed errors only; fuzz smoke in CI).
  • Fixtures generated by bsdtar (committed, provenance manifest), differential tests vs package:archive, benchmarks recorded in bench/results/.
• M0: package scaffolding: pub workspace membership, shared strict lints, CI matrix (VM on Linux/macOS/Windows; web via dart2js and dart2wasm).