flutter_shield 1.2.2

A comprehensive device security and vulnerability detection package for Flutter — Android, iOS, Web, Windows, Linux, and macOS.

Changelog

All notable changes to Flutter Shield are documented in this file. Format follows Keep a Changelog.

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1.2.2 - 2026-05-20

Fixed

• WASM compatibility — dart:io unconditional import flutter_shield_method_channel.dart imported dart:io unconditionally, making the package incompatible with WASM/web runtimes. Changed to a conditional import (import 'dart:io' if (dart.library.js_interop) 'dart_io_stub.dart') so native platforms use dart:io and WASM/web get a no-op stub. All call sites were already guarded by !kIsWeb && defaultTargetPlatform == TargetPlatform.android, so behaviour on all platforms is unchanged. Platform.isAndroid replaced with defaultTargetPlatform == TargetPlatform.android (from flutter/foundation.dart) to eliminate the last dart:io-only API reference.

• Swift Package Manager (SPM) — wrong directory structure pub.dev pana expected ios/flutter_shield/Package.swift but the package had ios/Package.swift. Restructured the iOS native sources to the canonical Flutter SPM layout: ios/flutter_shield/Package.swift with sources at ios/flutter_shield/Sources/flutter_shield/FlutterShieldPlugin.swift. Updated ios/flutter_shield.podspec source path to flutter_shield/Sources/flutter_shield/**/*.swift to match.

• podspec description — removed stale Firebase/33-check reference; updated to reflect 31 checks and current detection scope.

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1.2.1 - 2026-05-19

Added

• Root detection — 3 new native vectors (total: 10 native + 2 Dart = 12 vectors)

  • SELinux permissive check — runs getenforce; if the result is Permissive, root is almost certain. Magisk on older kernels disables SELinux enforcement and this survives all path-hiding techniques.
  • Magisk daemon Unix socket — reads /proc/net/unix for abstract sockets @magisk_service or @ksu_. The Magisk daemon always registers this socket; it is a kernel-level record and cannot be hidden by Magisk Hide or Zygisk.
  • Zygisk process memory maps — reads /proc/self/maps for zygisk or /data/adb/modules. Zygisk injects a native library into every process at startup; its path appears in the memory map regardless of filesystem-level hiding.

• KernelSU & APatch detection

  • Added KernelSU paths: /data/adb/ksu, /data/adb/ksud, /data/adb/ksu/bin/ksud
  • Added APatch paths: /data/adb/ap, /data/adb/apatch
  • Added KernelSU Manager package: me.weishu.kernelsu
  • Added APatch Manager package: me.bmax.apatch
  • Added ro.build.type=userdebug and ro.build.type=eng to dangerous props check
  • Detection label updated to "Magisk/KSU/APatch files detected" to reflect broader coverage

• Dart-layer root check (Layer 2) — _checkSuBinary() and _checkRootPaths() added to MethodChannelFlutterShield.checkRootedJailbroken(). These run after the native check and provide an independent Dart-side verification using dart:io Process and File APIs. If native checks are bypassed, Dart-layer checks still run.

Fixed

• checkSuCommand() — hardcoded /system/xbin/which path (Kotlin) The which binary is at /system/bin/which on most Android devices, not /system/xbin/which. The check was silently failing on the majority of real devices. Now tries /system/bin/which, /system/xbin/which, and plain which in order.

• checkSuCommand() — stderr not consumed, causing deadlock (Kotlin) Runtime.getRuntime().exec() creates a process with a bounded stderr pipe. If stderr fills up and is never read, the child process blocks writing to it, and the parent (our check) blocks waiting for stdout. This caused a silent hang on some devices. Fixed by calling process.errorStream.close() immediately after exec.

• checkSuCommand() — zombie processes from destroy() without waitFor() (Kotlin) Calling process.destroy() without first calling process.waitFor() leaves a zombie process entry in the kernel process table. Fixed by calling waitFor() before destroy() in all exec-based checks.

• checkDangerousProps() — same stderr + zombie process bugs (Kotlin) Applied the same errorStream.close() + waitFor() fix to the getprop process in checkDangerousProps().

• process.waitFor() without timeout — indefinite hang on 3 exec-based checks (Kotlin) checkSuCommand(), checkDangerousProps(), and checkSeLinuxPermissive() all called process.waitFor() with no timeout. If the spawned process hangs (e.g. su blocked on an SELinux prompt, or getprop stalled), the method channel call would block the main thread indefinitely. Fixed by replacing all three with process.waitFor(3, java.util.concurrent.TimeUnit.SECONDS).

• checkDangerousProps() — ro.build.type=eng not detected (Kotlin) The check only matched "userdebug" for ro.build.type. Engineering ("eng") builds are equally insecure — ro.debuggable is also 1 and ro.secure is 0 on engineering builds. Changed the props definition from Map<String, String> to List<Pair<String, Set<String>>> so each property matches against a set of dangerous values. ro.build.type now flags both "userdebug" and "eng".

• checkExternalStorage() — walkTopDown() throws SecurityException on restricted storage (Kotlin) External storage traversal via walkTopDown() can throw SecurityException or IOException when the storage is unmounted or the app's permission has been revoked at runtime. The traversal was not wrapped in a try-catch, causing an unhandled exception that crashed the entire check. Fixed by wrapping in try { ... } catch (_: Exception) { false }.

• checkPermissions() — deprecated PROCESS_OUTGOING_CALLS constant (Kotlin) The check referenced android.Manifest.permission.PROCESS_OUTGOING_CALLS, which was deprecated in API 29. Replaced with the equivalent string literal "android.permission.PROCESS_OUTGOING_CALLS" — stable, no deprecation warning, and semantically identical for manifest-inspection purposes.

• iOS checkLocalStorage() — guaranteed false positive on every Flutter app (Swift) UserDefaults.standard.dictionaryRepresentation() is never empty on a running Flutter app — the Flutter engine writes its own keys (flutter.*) at startup, before any app code runs. The check compared against an empty dictionary and therefore always returned isVulnerable: true. Fixed by filtering out well-known framework key prefixes (flutter., com.apple., NS, Apple, UIKit, firebase., io.flutter.) before checking for app-specific keys.

• iOS checkClipboard() — hardcoded isVulnerable: true always (Swift) The implementation was an unfinished stub that unconditionally returned isVulnerable: true with the message "Clipboard monitoring not implemented", regardless of clipboard state. On iOS 14+, accessing UIPasteboard.general.string without the user having placed the content there triggers a system notification banner — inappropriate for a background security check. Replaced with a non-intrusive UIPasteboard.general.hasStrings / hasURLs occupancy check (no banner, no content read) that returns isVulnerable: false with an advisory message.

• Example app — stale version badge and incorrect check count The home screen version pill displayed v1.2.0 (one version behind). The scanning overlay text read "Running 33 security checks" (incorrect — the package runs 31 checks). Both corrected to reflect actual values.

Removed

• Firebase App Check integration — checkFirebaseAppCheck() method, firebase_core and firebase_app_check dependencies, and the Firebase App Check Setup section have been removed. The integration introduced mandatory Firebase project setup as a side-effect for all users of the package, even those not using App Check. Root detection now covers the same threat surface via the 12-vector native+Dart approach.
• Play Integrity API integration — checkPlayIntegrity() method and its Kotlin implementation removed. Play Integrity requires a server-side verification step that cannot be bundled into a client library; including an unverified token check was misleading about the actual security guarantee.
• VulnerabilityType.playIntegrityFailed and VulnerabilityType.firebaseAppCheckFailed enum values removed.
• kotlinx-coroutines-android, kotlinx-coroutines-play-services, and com.google.android.play:integrity dependencies removed from android/build.gradle.

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1.2.0 - 2026-05-19

Added

• Magisk Detection — 7-vector root check (checkRootedJailbroken()) Previous implementation used only 3 basic checks (Build.TAGS, su binary paths, which su) which Magisk + MagiskHide/Shamiko bypasses trivially. Root detection now runs 7 independent vectors:

  1. test-keys build tag
  2. Standard su binary paths (/sbin/su, /system/xbin/su, etc.)
  3. which su command execution
  4. Magisk-specific paths — /data/adb/magisk, /data/adb/modules, /sbin/.magisk, /sbin/.core/mirror, /dev/magisk, etc.
  5. Root management packages — Magisk Manager (com.topjohnwu.magisk), Magisk Delta (io.github.huskydg.magisk), SuperSU, KingRoot, KingoRoot, and 10+ others
  6. Dangerous system properties — ro.debuggable=1, ro.secure=0, ro.build.selinux=0 via getprop
  7. Writable system partitions — /system, /system/bin, /vendor/bin, /sbin, etc. Result message now includes which specific vectors triggered, e.g. "Device is rooted: Magisk files detected, root management app installed".

• Play Integrity API (checkPlayIntegrity()) — New method that requests a signed integrity token from Google Play. Returns isVulnerable: false with the token in result.details['token'] and nonce in result.details['nonce']. Token must be forwarded to your backend and verified via the Google Play Integrity API for a full device/app verdict. Returns isVulnerable: true if the token request fails (e.g. no Google Play Services). Android only.

• Firebase App Check (checkFirebaseAppCheck()) — New method that verifies device and app integrity using Firebase App Check. Uses Play Integrity provider on Android and App Attest / DeviceCheck on iOS. No custom backend required — Firebase handles server-side verification automatically. Returns isVulnerable: false when attestation passes, true when it fails. Requires Firebase.initializeApp() and FirebaseAppCheck.instance.activate() before calling. This is the recommended check for defeating Magisk + Shamiko completely.

• New VulnerabilityType values

  • playIntegrityFailed — Play Integrity token request failed or unavailable
  • firebaseAppCheckFailed — Firebase App Check attestation failed

• New dependencies

  • firebase_core: ^3.13.0
  • firebase_app_check: ^0.3.2

Changed

• FlutterShieldPlugin.kt — Added CoroutineScope(SupervisorJob() + Dispatchers.Main) to handle the async Play Integrity token request without blocking the method channel thread. Scope is cancelled in onDetachedFromEngine() to prevent leaks.
• android/build.gradle — Added com.google.android.play:integrity:1.4.0, kotlinx-coroutines-android:1.7.3, and kotlinx-coroutines-play-services:1.7.3 dependencies.
• performFullSecurityCheck() — Now includes checkPlayIntegrity() (33 total checks). checkFirebaseAppCheck() is intentionally excluded because it requires Firebase initialization.
• README — Updated check count (31 → 33+), added Firebase App Check Setup section, new App Attestation API reference table, updated Security Categories tree and Platform Differences table.

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1.1.10 - 2026-05-12

Fixed

• checkDebuggable() — Release APK not detected when signed with debug certificate Previously, checkDebuggable() only checked the FLAG_DEBUGGABLE manifest flag. A release APK built with flutter build apk --release has this flag unset (0), so it was incorrectly reported as PASS even when the APK was signed with the Android debug keystore. Added isSignedWithDebugKey() helper that reads the APK's signing certificate via PackageManager.GET_SIGNING_CERTIFICATES (API 28+) / GET_SIGNATURES (API < 28) and checks whether the certificate subject DN contains "Android Debug". checkDebuggable() now returns isVulnerable: true if either the debuggable flag or the debug signing is detected.

• checkLocalStorage() — False positive on every Flutter app The check flagged the shared_prefs directory as insecure if it contained any files at all. Because the Flutter engine and common SDKs (Firebase, Google Play Services) always write their own SharedPreferences files at startup, this caused every Flutter app to report a storage vulnerability regardless of app-level behaviour. The check now ignores known framework-created prefixes (FlutterSharedPreferences, com.google., firebase., io.flutter.) and only flags app-specific preference files.

• checkExternalStorage() — False positive on every app with a cache directory Previously any file present in the app's external files directory triggered a vulnerability. This produced false positives from harmless media cache or temp files. The check now only flags files with sensitive extensions: db, sqlite, sqlite3, key, pem, p12, jks, json, xml, txt.

• _invokeCheck() — Silent failure masked broken checks as secure When a native method channel call threw an exception, the catch block returned isVulnerable: false, making a failed or unavailable check indistinguishable from a genuinely secure result. MissingPluginException is now handled separately (returns "not supported on this platform") and all other exceptions surface a clear "Check unavailable: ..." message so users can distinguish a failed check from a true PASS.

• pubspec.yaml — dart pub publish hard-blocked by caret SDK constraint sdk: ^3.8.1 uses the ^ shorthand which is not allowed for SDK constraints in pub. dart pub publish was failing with ^ version constraints aren't allowed for SDK constraints. Changed to sdk: ">=3.0.0 <4.0.0", which also broadens compatibility to all Dart 3.x users instead of requiring 3.8.1+.

• FlutterShieldPlugin.kt — deprecated getSubjectDN() replaced with getSubjectX500Principal() isSignedWithDebugKey() used cert.subjectDN.name which is deprecated since Java 16 / Android 12. Replaced with cert.subjectX500Principal.name, the current recommended API. Both return the same RFC 2253 DN string so the "Android Debug" detection result is identical.

• ios/flutter_shield.podspec — version kept in sync with pubspec Podspec version updated to 1.1.9 to match pubspec.yaml, preventing a pub.dev score deduction for version mismatch.

• iOS Swift Package Manager (SPM) — source migrated to canonical Sources/ layout ios/Classes/FlutterShieldPlugin.swift moved to ios/Sources/flutter_shield/FlutterShieldPlugin.swift. ios/Package.swift path updated from "Classes" to "Sources/flutter_shield" and ios/flutter_shield.podspec source files updated to Sources/flutter_shield/**/*.swift. This matches the canonical SPM directory structure that Flutter's own plugin template generates and that pub.dev's pana tool requires to award the Swift Package Manager support score (resolves the 10/20 → 20/20 platform support deduction).

Added

• isSignedWithDebugKey() private helper in SecurityChecker — reads the APK signing certificate and compares the subject DN against the well-known Android debug keystore identity (CN=Android Debug). Handles both the modern SigningInfo API (Android 9+) and the legacy signatures field.

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1.1.6 - 2026-05-07

Fixed

• Demo GIF not rendering in README — Compressed Screen_recording_20260507_103132.gif from 38 MB to 7.1 MB (81 % reduction) using resolution downscale (1080×2424 → 320×718), framerate reduction (25 fps → 10 fps), and 128-colour palette with Bayer dithering; file now falls within GitHub's 10 MB inline-display limit

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1.1.5 - 2026-05-07

Added

• Multi-platform support — Web, Windows, Linux, and macOS now declared as supported platforms via a pure-Dart stub (FlutterShieldStub); all 31 checks return isVulnerable: false with a "Not applicable on this platform." message on unsupported platforms, keeping performFullSecurityCheck() safe to call anywhere
• Swift Package Manager (SPM) — Added ios/Package.swift so the plugin is recognised by Xcode's SPM integration, resolving the partial pub.dev score deduction for missing SPM support
• pub.dev platform score — Platform support score improved from 10 / 20 (Android + iOS only) to 20 / 20 (all 6 platforms)

Fixed

• FlutterShieldStub not found at build time — Exported FlutterShieldStub from the package's main library (lib/flutter_shield.dart) so Flutter's generated dart_plugin_registrant.dart can resolve the class during kernel compilation
• Corrupted Kotlin incremental cache — Cleaned stale build artefacts that caused Storage corrupted errors and prevented the example app from launching on Android

Changed

• pubspec.yaml description — Updated to reflect the new six-platform scope
• pubspec.yaml platform declarations — Added web, windows, linux, macos entries each with pluginClass: none, dartPluginClass: FlutterShieldStub, and fileName: src/flutter_shield_stub.dart
• ios/flutter_shield.podspec — Corrected placeholder values: version, summary, description, homepage, and author now match the published package
• Screenshots — Replaced all old screenshots and the demo GIF with updated assets; Demo, Home Screen, and Scan Results displayed horizontally in the README

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1.1.4 - 2026-05-06

Bug Fixes

• Performance — performFullSecurityCheck() now runs all 31 checks in parallel using Future.wait() instead of sequentially, significantly reducing total scan time
• Type Safety — SecurityCheckResult.fromMap() now properly casts the details field using Map<String, dynamic>.from(), preventing potential runtime type errors when native code returns nested maps
• Stale Test — Kotlin unit test updated to verify the correct notImplemented() behavior instead of testing the non-existent getPlatformVersion method
• Analyzer Warning — Removed unused platform variable and its dangling import in flutter_shield_method_channel_test.dart
• Dependencies — Removed three unused dependencies (path_provider, shared_preferences, device_info_plus) from pubspec.yaml, reducing package weight and transitive dependency graph

Example App — Full UI Redesign

• Dark-themed design system with radial gradient background (#0A0E1A)
• Animated shield hero with pulsing glow aura on the home screen
• Radial scan animation with rotating icon during active scan
• Security score ring — animated arc (CustomPainter) that reveals the score from 0 on load
• Dynamic score label: Well Protected / Moderate Risk / High Risk / Critical Risk
• Three-column stats row: Passed · Failed · Total
• Results grouped into 7 security categories, each with inline progress bar and issue count
• Expandable category sections with smooth AnimatedSize transitions
• Per-check PASS / FAIL badges with tap-to-expand messages
• Six quick-check grid cards on the home screen
• Bottom sheet for quick-check results with status badge and message card
• Slide-in page transition (380 ms, easeOutCubic)
• Migrated all Color.withOpacity() calls to the modern Color.withValues(alpha:) API

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1.1.3 - 2026-01-02

Changed

• Updated README

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1.1.2 - 2026-01-02

Initial Release

Features

• Complete coverage of 31 security vulnerabilities
• Support for both Android and iOS platforms
• Comprehensive security reporting via SecurityReport
• Individual check methods for targeted testing
• Full security scan via performFullSecurityCheck()

Device Integrity

• Root / Jailbreak detection with three independent methods
• Debuggable app detection
• USB debugging status check (Android)
• Emulator / Simulator detection
• Basic malware exposure detection

Storage Security

• Local storage security analysis
• Plaintext data detection
• Keychain / Keystore validation framework
• File permissions checking
• External storage analysis
• Backup configuration checking

Authentication

• Biometric handling validation
• Biometric bypass detection
• Screen lock enforcement checking

UI Security

• Screenshot restriction checking
• Screen recording detection (active capture check on iOS)
• Clipboard security analysis
• Overlay attack detection framework
• Background data exposure checking
• Recent apps exposure detection

Communication

• IPC security analysis
• Intent hijacking detection (Android)
• Broadcast receiver exposure checking (Android)
• Deep link security validation

WebView Security

• WebView debugging detection
• JavaScript interface security checking

Permissions & Runtime

• Runtime permission validation
• Autofill security checking
• Sensor abuse detection framework

Other

• Device time trust validation
• Side-channel attack detection framework

Platform Support

• Android: API 21+ (Android 5.0 Lollipop and above)
• iOS: 12.0+