attested_secure_keys 0.1.0-dev.2

Hardware-backed, attestable EC P-256 keys for Flutter — Android Keystore/StrongBox and iOS Secure Enclave, non-exportable, ES256/JOSE, with key attestation.

Changelog

0.1.0-dev.2

Housekeeping prerelease; no public API changes.

• Renamed the internal Android package and iOS keychain service identifiers from ro.roeid.* to io.github.exilonx.*, removing all references to the originating project from the published artifacts.
• Reverted meta to ^1.17.0 to match the Flutter SDK's pin (a ^1.18.0 floor excluded the SDK-pinned version and broke flutter pub get).

0.1.0-dev.1

First prerelease — published as -dev to test the release pipeline and soak the implementation before a stable 0.1.0. Both platforms are device-verified: Android (StrongBox/TEE attestation) via Firebase Test Lab, and iOS (Secure Enclave + App Attest) on a physical iPhone.

Initial release (milestone M0 — spike + public API).

Added

• AttestedSecureKeys facade modeled on flutter_secure_storage: capabilities, generateKey, sign, attest, getKeyInfo, containsKey, deleteKey, listAliases.
• Normalized, platform-independent model: KeySecurityLevel, KeyAttestationType, UserAuthType, HwKey, Es256Signature, KeyAttestation, HwKeyInfo, DeviceKeyCapabilities, Jwk (RFC 7517 / 7638 thumbprint / RFC 9052 COSE_Key).
• Typed Pigeon platform channel (Dart ⇄ Kotlin ⇄ Swift).
• Android (first-party Keystore): EC P-256 keygen with StrongBox → TEE → software fallback, ES256 signing with JDK BigInteger DER→raw R‖S conversion, security-level introspection, attestation-chain passthrough, key CRUD, and a capability probe.
• iOS (first-party CryptoKit / Security / DeviceCheck): Secure Enclave keygen + ES256 signing (rawRepresentation), keychain blob persistence, capability reporting, and an App Attest scaffold that binds the key's JWK thumbprint + server nonce.
• Honest, explicit fallback reporting (requested vs effective level; attestationType) and typed errors (HwKeyUnsupportedError, UserNotAuthenticatedError, KeyNotFoundError, AttestationUnavailableError).
• Example app and a Dart unit-test suite.

Known limitations

• In-app biometric prompt for auth-gated signing (androidx.biometric BiometricPrompt.CryptoObject) and binding the server nonce as the Android attestation challenge are scheduled for M1.
• KeyAttestation.toOid4vciKeyAttestationJwt() and the Node verifier are scheduled for M2.
• iOS native code is now device-verified on a physical iPhone (Secure Enclave + App Attest); broader OS-version / CI device coverage is ongoing.